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Accessible summary
 This paper advances the debate that considers critical realism as an alternative
approach for understanding gender and mental health and its relatedness to research
and practice.
 The paper highlights the potential for mental health research and practice because
critical realism facilitates changes in our understanding while not discarding that
which is already known.
 It allows the biological (sex) and social (gender) domains of knowledge for mental
health and illness to coexist, without either being reduced to or defined by the other.
 Both ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ need to be viewed as having separate influences on mental
health and illness.
Abstract
This paper seeks to advance the debate that considers critical realism as an alterna-
tive approach for understanding gender and mental health and its relatedness to
mental health research and practice. The knowledge base of how ‘sex’ and ‘gender’
affect mental health and illness is expanding. However, the way we conceptualize
gender is significant and challenging as quite often our ability to think about ‘gender’
as independent of ‘sex’ is not common. The influences and interplay of how sex
(biological) and gender (social) affect mental health and illness requires consider-
ation. Critical realism suggests a shared ontology and epistemology for the natural
and social sciences. While much of the debate surrounding gender is guided within
a constructivist discourse, an exploration of the concept ‘gender’ is reflected on and
some key realist propositions are considered for mental health research and practice.
This is achieved through the works of some key realist theorists. Critical realism
offers potential for research and practice in relation to gender and mental health
because it facilitates changes in our understanding, while simultaneously, not dis-
carding that which is already known. In so doing, it allows the biological (sex) and
social (gender) domains of knowledge for mental health and illness to coexist,
without either being reduced to or defined by the other. Arguably, greater depth and
explanations for gender and mental health issues are presented within a realist
metatheory.jpm_1559 442..451
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Introduction
Gender studies have moved beyond the binary division
between masculinity and femininity to confronting the
division between ‘gender neutral’ and ‘gendered’ (Holter
2005). Therefore, how gender is currently understood and
its influence is significant and challenging for health
research and practice. Indeed, our ability to think about
gender as independent of sex is not common (Bradby
2008). Despite a growing literature, the concepts sex (bio-
logical) and gender (sociological) have tended to be con-
flated within empirical research (Annandale & Hunt
1990). Recent literature identifies gender as diverse and
complex (Connell 1987, 2000, 2002, 2005, Butler 1990,
2004, Brod & Kaufman 1994, Lorber 1994, Mac an Ghaill
1996, Whitehead 2002, Kimmel 2004). This complexity
challenges health-related research and practice as most of
us combine masculinity and femininity in differing ways
(Connell 2002).
Prior (1999) indicates how psychiatric literature has
changed in recent years from gendered disparaging lan-
guage to one that is gender neutral. While such changes
are very welcome, particularly for women, gender is
now considered a key sociocultural influence on health
(Courtenay 2000) and a critical determinant of mental
health. Bearing this in mind, strategies for reducing risk in
mental health cannot be gender neutral since the risks are
gender-specific (World Health Organization 2001). For
example, gender-specific risks include the power and
control men and women have in relation to their socio-
economic positions, roles, social status and access to
resources and treatment. However, a gender neutral
approach is considered as not recognizing the similarities
and differences that exist among and between men and
women.
While much of the debate surrounding gender is
guided within a constructivist discourse [see e.g. Alsop
et al. (2002) for an overview of theories and the social
construction of gender], it is argued that critical
realism offers an alternative approach. For instance,
Bergin et al. (2008) make a case for critical realism
as a potential philosophical framework for the study of
gender and mental health. While the case is philosophically
well argued for, its relatedness to mental health
research and practice requires further development.
With this in mind, Carpenter (2000) suggests that a
realist metatheory has potential for research exploring
gender, health and illness, and describes eight realist
propositions that allow us to change and still not discard
the already established frameworks. These propositions
need to be considered in relation to gender and mental
health.
Key critical realist principles
Critical realism is an emerging metatheory that suggests a
shared ontology and epistemology for the natural and
social sciences (Sayer 1992). It argues that an external
reality exists that is separate to what is experienced (Collier
1994, Danermark et al. 2002). A primary concern of criti-
cal realism is its questioning about what exists (ontology)
and advocates a philosophy of reality that starts with
ontology as distinct from epistemology (Bhaskar 1978).
When what exists is identified, critical realism then concen-
trates on questions concerning the construction of knowl-
edge about that existence (Frauley & Pearce 2007). This is
a fundamental difference that sets apart critical realism
from other metatheoretical positions. Some of the key prin-
ciples of critical realism are briefly outlined below.
One fundamental realist principle is that reality is dif-
ferentiated and stratified. Three different domains of the
social and natural world are distinguished: the real, the
actual and the empirical, whereby mechanisms (what
makes something happen in the world) events and experi-
ences are represented and overlap via these three domains
(Collier 1994, Bhaskar 1998). The real domain is all that
exists (natural or social) whether we experience it or not or
have knowledge of its nature. As Sayer (2000, p. 11) says,
it is the area where objects, their structures and powers are.
The actual domain refers to what happens in reality when
the powers of the real are activated and events and expe-
riences are produced (Collier 1994, Sayer 2000). The
empirical domain is comprised only of what we experience
(directly or indirectly); however, not all events are experi-
enced (Collier 1994). Thus the domain of the real is distinct
and greater than the empirical. However, the empirical is in
a ‘contingent relation’ to the domains of the actual and the
real because ‘to be (either for an entity or structure or for
an event) is not to be perceived’ (Outhwaite 1998, p. 282).
A basic distinction between two dimensions of knowl-
edge is made, namely, the intransitive and transitive. The
intransitive refers to the real entities or objects of scientific
knowledge that represent the natural and social world (Out-
hwaite 1987) – the ontological (Danermark et al. 2002). It
can include and extend to all that exists (Bhaskar 1978).
Science tries to understand this dimension through socially
produced theories (transitive dimension) (Sayer 2000). It is
this knowledge that informs our understanding of what
exists – the epistemological (Danermark et al. 2002).
Causality from a realist perspective is the process of
‘identifying causal mechanisms and how they work, and
discovering if they have been activated and under what
conditions’ (Sayer 2000, p. 14). Thus, it is possible to
discover if the interplay of mechanisms have produced
events, or not, that may or may not be observed (Daner-
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mark et al. 2002). Therefore, realists seek to look beyond
what is directly observable within the domain of the
empirical to the domain of the real, and look for the
outcome of mechanism interplay. Critical realism attempts
to produce in-depth explanations of the ‘causal mecha-
nisms’; how they exert effect; if they have been triggered;
and under what circumstances they have been activated
(Sayer 2000). On the other hand, constructivism explores
complex individualized social realities, and therefore, views
causality as the process of constructing meaning that is a
result of human activity that does not occur in a linear way
(Rogers & Pilgrim 2005). Constructivism is now further
explored in relation to our understanding of gender.
Constructivism
Constructivism as a leading position within sociology holds
a basic belief that ‘reality is not self-evident, stable and
waiting to be discovered, but . . . a product of human activ-
ity’ (Rogers & Pilgrim 2005, p. 15). While constructivism
encompasses a number of differing traditions (e.g. symbolic
interactionism, ethnomethodology, phenomenology), they
all describe reality as being socially constructed and what
exists is dependent upon a person’s interaction, interpreta-
tion and understanding of that reality (or multiple reali-
ties), and its socially produced knowledge (Guba &
Lincoln 1994, Crotty 1998). From a realist perspective, this
creates a tendency towards an ‘epistemological relativism’
and ‘judgemental relativism’ (the idea that we cannot have
satisfactory criteria for determining which knowledge is
more appropriate and closer to the truth than others).
Bhaskar (1978, 1998) suggests constructivism fails to rec-
ognize that there is more to reality than what is articulated
through the language of individuals and tends to collapse
the intransitive dimension to a discourse about ‘being’ only
– the ‘linguistic fallacy’. Although critical realism does,
however, accept the premise that ‘terms exist within dis-
course, their referents may exist outside (our) discourse:
discourse and knowledge are not merely self-referential –
that is why they are fallible!’ (Sayer 2000, p. 62).
Several prominent critical realists distinguish between
‘strong’ and ‘weak’ forms of social constructivism. For
instance, Sayer (2000) suggests that realists can accept
‘weak’ constructivism and its socially produced knowledge.
This is in part due to ‘weak’ constructivism accepting an
intransitive dimension of reality that does not restrict our
understanding of the world (social and natural) to that
which is as a result of interpretation and discourse only –
‘strong’ constructivism.
Bhaskar (1998, p. 29) challenges the premise that it is
misleading to assume ‘that statements about being can be
reduced to or analysed in terms of statements about knowl-
edge’ – the epistemic fallacy. This fallacy tends to overstate
the transitive dimension of knowledge and critics suggest
that constructivism is unable to consider the social world as
greater than our aggregate beliefs, to a social world that
also includes ‘structural and institutional features’ that are
in some ways separate of an individual’s thinking and
interpretation (Pawson & Tilley 1997, p. 23). For instance,
although constructivism has made significant contributions
in explaining health inequalities and how people construct
meaningful understandings of their health, it has not
escaped criticism, for overstating agency (conscious under-
standings of social actors) to the detriment of structure
(Wainwright & Forbes 2000). Williams (2003, p. 52) pro-
poses that constructivism (strong) is ‘falling prey to the
epistemic fallacy’ and cites ‘disease, for example, . . . is
patently more than just a social construct, however, impor-
tant the latter might be. Disease labels, one might say,
describe but do not constitute disease. The reality of dis-
ease, . . . is not exhausted by our descriptions of it. If only
it were!’ This debate is advanced in relation to our under-
standing of gender that encompasses but goes beyond con-
structivism, and also challenges the ‘natural attitude’ views
both at a micro and macro level.
Understanding gender beyond constructivism
Constructivism is credited with providing understandings
of how individuals formulate and express their gendered
identities (Kimmel 2004). Gender operates at individual,
relational, organizational and institutional levels whereby
each supports and sustains the other (Lorber & Moore
2002). Gender as a social institution orders the social pro-
cesses of everyday life and indeed can determine individual
prospects (Lorber 1994).
Although critical realism accepts knowledge that is
socially defined by an individual, this does not suggest that
it cannot identify social constructions that can be real and
independent of a person’s awareness (Sayer 2000). For
example, institutions may often produce individual differ-
ences we assume are the result of the individual (Kimmel
2004). Therefore, gender as a socially produced institution
may often have a considerable independence from the
descriptions that some people may have and such descrip-
tions may not always be an adequate or sufficient repre-
sentation (Sayer 2000).
With this in mind, a theory of gender needs to avoid the
extremes of constructivism (strong); engage an approach
that accepts the existence of a real world that can accept the
superiority of some assertions over others (Busfield 1996).
For example, the dangers of constructivism (strong) and
gender in establishing a true picture of men and masculini-
ties fails to sufficiently deal with the similarities and differ-
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ences of men and their relationships with institutions such
as class, race or disability (Collinson & Hearn 1994, Hearn
& Collinson 1994, Hearn 1996). These issues have been
shown to be significant in relation to gender, and the
mental health and illness of men and women (Busfield
1996, Emslie et al. 2006).
An understanding of gender both as an individual
quality and as a social institution (Lorber 1994, Kimmel
2004) requires theories that adequately explore how
gender impacts at the macro (organizational, institutions,
social structures) and micro (intrapersonal and relational)
levels. A possible way forward is through Layder’s (1993,
1998, 2006) realist understanding of the social world as
ontologically multifaceted (four social domains: psycho-
biography, situated activity, social settings and contextual
resources). This understanding accepts coexistence for ‘sex’
and ‘gender.’
Challenging the ‘natural attitude’: coexistence for ‘sex’
and ‘gender’
The popular belief that gender is a natural expansion of
sex is challenged within sociological debate and rejected
(Connell 1987, 2002, 2005, Laner 2000, Knaak 2004).
The biological paradigm assumes that ‘sex’ (biological) is
an unchanging starting point upon which gender identity is
constructed (Oakley 1972, Nicholson 1994). However,
Connell (2005) suggests that while gender is a social prac-
tice that has a continued reference to bodies and what they
do, it is not a social practice that is solely reduced to the
body. He states that ‘gender is the structure of social rela-
tions that centres on the reproductive arena, and the set of
practices (governed by this structure) that bring reproduc-
tive distinctions between bodies into social processes’
(Connell 2002, p. 10). This suggests that gender patterns
may vary from one culture to the next. It further implies
that gender arrangements are reproduced socially and that
gender is a social structure that has a particular relation-
ship or association with the body (Connell 2002).
Such thinking includes both a dichotomy and difference
between men and women. However, it moves beyond this
traditional notion of gender to a position of gender and
diversity. Therefore, gender needs to be understood at an
individual, relational and structural level with reference to
how the historical arrangements of power at each level
impact upon and influence men and women, which is
known as the ‘gender order’ (Connell 1987).
However, Connell (2005) points to the fact that some
natural theorists constantly try to undermine gender by
attempting to confirm that ‘human social arrangements are
a reflex of evolutionary imperatives’ (p. 72). Gender exists
precisely to the extent that biology does not control the
social while still acknowledging the realities of reproductive
biology (Connell 2005). There is a strong relation between
social practice and biology, but this is very different from
that assumed by natural theorists (Connell 1987).
If gender relations are understood only as something
that is natural as opposed to a product of socialization,
then explanations of inequality are also viewed as natural
or biologically determined, understandings that are not
totally real and potentially fallible (Sayer 2000). Critical
realism is both analytical and critical of the social practices
it studies, and also, of the existing theories that explain
such practices. Sometimes, social practices can be based
upon existing theories that may be real or not, for example,
gender and the natural attitude, that is gender as a natural
expansion of sex (Sayer 2000, Robson 2002).
Although social structures (gender) exist only where
people construct them, their powers are often ‘irreducible’
to those individuals. For that reason, an understanding of
individuals will sometimes require a ‘macro regress’ to the
social institutions in which they are situated, as well as a
‘micro regress’ (Sayer 1992, p. 119). A critical realist way
forward is an understanding whereby the relations between
‘sex’ and ‘gender’ can be conceptualized as biological (sex)
mechanisms and social (gender) mechanisms coexisting but
neither mechanisms are essential in explaining the other.
Both have ‘emergent’ powers within their respective level(s)
or ‘stratum’, whereby they ‘cooperate to produce concrete
events’ (Danermark et al. 2002, p. 63).
From a mental health and illness perspective, this under-
standing is now being advanced whereby the terms ‘sex’
and ‘gender’ need to be clarified and more fully understood
for future research (World Health Organization 2004).
Both ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ differences need to be viewed as
separate influences on mental health and illness and the
‘interplay of the biological and the social’ requires further
debate (Busfield 2001, p. 13).
Interdisciplinary research as a way forward
Arguably, the social and biomedical domains of mental
health and illness need to be linked through an interdis-
ciplinary research approach (World Health Organization
2004). A realist understanding of an interdisciplinary
research approach differs from what is often referred to
as multidisciplinary research in that it studies ‘. . .
complex phenomenon and how that phenomenon is
manifested at different levels of reality. This is done by
using specific theories and methods developed for each
level. The results are then integrated in an attempt to
reach a more holistic perspective on the phenomenon’
(Danermark 2002, p. 61). For example, as previously
stated, gender is a complex phenomenon that exists and
Realist metatheory, gender and mental health
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functions at an individual, relational, organizational and
institutional level whereby each supports and sustains the
other (Lorber & Moore 2002). However, each level
requires analysing at its own respective but essential level
using possibly different methods. In so doing, results can
then be integrated to provide a more realist perspective of
such complex phenomenon.
A constructivist tendency to conflate the ontological
with the epistemological (epistemic fallacy) tends to reduce
the biological person to a knowledge that is socially pro-
duced and understood (Williams 1999), an inaccurate con-
structivist legacy (Archer 1995). There is, in recent times, a
renewed debate to appreciate the complex relations
between the biological and the social in terms that are
non-reductionist and non-deterministic (Benton 1991,
Kelly & Field 1996, Williams 1999, 2002, 2003, 2006,
Carpenter 2000), that considers ‘the biological in terms
which do not simply reduce it to the social or vice versa’
(Williams 1999, p. 807). This requires new ways for think-
ing and theorizing the embodied complexity of relations
between the biological and the social (Newton 2003). A
critical realist philosophy may underpin such endeavours
as a way forward (Williams 2006), for example, its poten-
tial for health, mental illness and disability (Busfield 1996,
Williams 1999, 2003, Wainwright & Forbes 2000). This
approach offers a framework for a greater understanding
of how the multiplicity of masculinities (hegemony, subor-
dination, marginalization, complicity) (Connell 2005) and
femininities can impact on the mental health of individuals.
This understanding is now considered further in the direc-
tion of a potential realist framework.
A potential realist framework for gender and
mental health
How sex (biological) and gender affect the health of both
women and men is expanding, with an understanding that
neither one alone influences mental health and illness (Payne
2006). However, sociological and biological explanations of
illness in the past have often assumed polarized positions
(Bird & Rieker 1999). Biological explanations emphasize
the physiological differences between males and females.
Sociological explanations explore how gender as a social
construct is present in almost every aspect of illness – from
risk to protection from illness; how we interpret symptoms;
the process of diagnosing; ideology associated with certain
mental illnesses and gender; how health care is delivered and
gender sensitivity; funding priorities and knowledge of ill-
nesses (Lorber & Moore 2002, Payne 2006). Central to this
gender relational approach is where gender is viewed as
diversity (Sabo 1999, Schofield et al. 2000). A strict adher-
ence to either a biological or a sociological approach only is
criticized as limiting our contextual understanding (Levine
1995). Critics of the biological highlight the lack of differ-
ences that exists between the sexes, contrary to what is
thought (Fausto-Sterling 1992, 2000); and sociological
research is criticized for minimizing physiology (Bird &
Rieker 1999), and viewing the social context as an essential
part of any illness (Lorber & Moore 2002).
As previously stated, critical realism is a relatively new
and emerging metatheory, with a growing number within
the field of mental health questioning the traditional theo-
retical approaches currently used within the discourse of
mental health and illness (Greenwood 1994, Busfield 1996,
2001, Pilgrim & Rogers 1997, Pilgrim & Bentall 1999,
Rogers & Pilgrim 2005, Bergin et al. 2008). These writers
argue that critical realism’s value lies in its accommodative
power to reconcile other metatheoretical perspectives into
a valuable framework for understanding.
Carpenter (2000) argues that a critical realist frame-
work has potential for research on gender, health and
illness. He suggests that this is a suitable process for achiev-
ing a balance between ‘. . . structure and process, and
analysis of biology and culture . . .’ (p. 47); and argues that
a realist framework facilitates this process of amalgam-
ation of knowledge, because it makes no basic distinctions
between the importance of ‘medicine’ and sociology. He
describes eight realist propositions for gender and health
(Box 1, Carpenter 2000, pp. 36–63) that allow us to
change and still not discard the already established frame-
works for gender and health. These propositions are con-
sidered in relation to gender and mental health.
Box 1
1. There is a need to start from gender, rather than
women, and health.
2. The biological, social and cultural influences on
male and female health are more similar than
different.
3. There is much ‘structured diversity’ in health
experiences among men and women, as well as
between them.
4. Gendered patterns of mortality and morbidity are
not just a statistical artefact.
5. ‘Natural’ and social selection play a part in gen-
dered patterns of health.
6. Gendered patterns of health and illness are the
historical product of ‘social structuration’.
7. Social relations can have positive or negative
health effects.
8. Women’s advantage in life expectancy is a mixed
blessing?
M. Bergin et al.
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‘There is a need to start from gender, rather than
women, and health’
The need to start from gender rather than women only and
to explore the gender order and its relational dimensions is
significant for the study of mental health and illness for
both men and women. Indeed, much of the literature sur-
rounding gender and mental illness has been explored by
feminist writers with a particular focus on women (Chesler
1972, Penfold & Walker 1984, Showalter 1987). This has
led to an understanding of gender to mean women only
with much sociological inquiry into health inequalities not
focusing on the gendered needs of men with mental health
difficulties (Rogers & Pilgrim 2003, 2005). Broadly speak-
ing, this feminist evaluation of women and mental illness
has been attributed to an oppressive patriarchal system
within psychiatry that controls women (Chesler 1972,
Penfold & Walker 1984, Showalter 1987, Ussher 1991).
However, Busfield (1996) demonstrates how both men and
women are regulated by the psychiatric system and how
our understandings of mental illnesses interrelate with
gender. Busfield (1996) argues that gender permeates cat-
egories of mental illness and emphasizes the importance of
inequities of power not only between but also within
various groups of men (subordinate, marginalized, hege-
monic) and women. For instance, she cites shell shock
during the First World War and Brown & Harris’s (1978)
study of the social origins of depression as examples to
support the gendered social processes in the causation of
mental illness. Such powerlessness for some men and
women may often lead to their behaviours being judged as
irrational. Therefore, strategies for reducing risk in mental
health cannot be gender neutral since the risks are gender-
specific (World Health Organization 2001).
‘The biological, social and cultural influences on male
and female health are more similar than different’
Recent analysis of alleged differences between males and
females are strongly challenged (Maccoby & Jacklin 1975,
Fausto-Sterling 1992, 2000) with the overwhelming con-
clusion from a hundred years of ‘sex difference’ research
that men and women are psychologically very similar
(Connell 2002). A further realist proposition suggests that
the biological, social and cultural influences on male and
female health are more similar than different (Carpenter
2000). However, a belief that certain mental illnesses were
seen as sex-specific is evident, for example, depression as a
female problem (Brown & Harris 1978) and current
reporting for depression seems to sustain this view (World
Health Organization 2001, 2004). Both biological and
sociological research has contributed to this belief (ibid).
While evidence relating to the role of biology (sex) is
mixed, gender is considered a significant risk factor (Payne
2006). For instance, Chen et al. (2005) concluded that the
incidence of depression among women was lower in some
states of America where there was greater economic equal-
ity between men and women. They suggest that it is gender
inequity that contributes to depression in women.
‘There is much “structured diversity” in health
experiences among men and women, as well as
between them’
This proposition acknowledges that men’s and women’s
health experiences are multifaceted. Carpenter (2000) sug-
gests that we should not assume that gender will be the most
significant factor to affect such experiences and need to
explore ‘social diversity’ as well as class, race and gender.
However, gender is present in almost every aspect of illness
– from risk to protection from illness; how we interpret
symptoms; the process of diagnosing; ideology associated
with certain mental illnesses and gender; how health care is
delivered and gender sensitivity; funding priorities and
knowledge of illnesses (Lorber & Moore 2002, Payne
2006). Central to this gender relational approach is where
gender is viewed as diversity (Sabo 1999, Schofield et al.
2000).
‘Gendered patterns of mortality and morbidity are not
just a statistical artefact’
A further realist proposition is that gendered patterns of
mortality and morbidity are not just a statistical artefact
(Carpenter 2000). From a social constructivist perspective,
it is suggested that masculinity may restrict men in reporting
illness due to a fear of being viewed as weak and that
women are often placed in a sick role and diagnosed with an
illness more readily by health professionals (Rogers &
Pilgrim 2005). A realist understanding accepts that illness
can only be socially defined. However, such illnesses have
very real physical, psychological and social effects (Carpen-
ter 2000). For instance, there is sometimes avoidance in
recognizing that some people with a mental illness experi-
ence severe pain and discomfort as a result of altered and/or
disturbed cognitive functioning (Busfield 2001, Mulvany
2001). A possible way of addressing this issue is through the
notion of embodiment (Seymour 1998, Connell 2002,
Krieger 2005), with a particular concentration on ‘embod-
ied irrationality’ (Mulvany 2001). This allows a person
with a mental illness to make sense of their biological
experiences, while equally acknowledging the experience
within a social domain, a coexistence for both the biological
and the social (Busfield 2001). The ‘double inclusiveness’
Realist metatheory, gender and mental health
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of critical realism (Bhaskar & Danermark 2006, p. 294)
allows various understandings to coexist and avoids the
incomplete positions of positivism and constructivism.
Various mechanisms at the biological, psychological, social
and cultural can be more clearly understood for an
enhanced delivery of care for gendered human beings with
a mental illness. In essence, gender and illness (mental)
needs to be understood in a way that does not reduce the
biological to the social, or vice versa (Williams 1999, 2006).
‘“Natural” and social selection play a part in
gendered patterns of health’
Carpenter (2000) demonstrates how the biological is
always ‘mediated’ by the social milieu in gendered patterns
of health. Mental illness in both women and men draws on
‘sex’- and ‘gender’-based explanations (Payne 2006). For
example, Scott (2000) in her review of research into
women’s and men’s mental health highlights the effects of
oestrogen (among other possible physiological causes) in
the differing psychopathological profiles of men and
women across the life span; while Emslie et al. (2006)
showed how some men engage aspects of hegemonic mas-
culinity (control, power, dominance) as part of their recov-
ery from depression. While for other men, conforming to
such masculinity could contribute to suicidal behaviour.
Gender can therefore influence the power and control men
and women have in relation to their socioeconomic posi-
tion, roles, social status and access to resources and treat-
ment; and is also critical in determining a person’s
vulnerability and exposure to mental health risks in society
(World Health Organization 2001).
‘Gendered patterns of health and illness are the
historical product of “social structuration” ’
The proposition that gendered patterns of health and
illness are a historical product emphasizes that mortality
and morbidity may change, for example, in response to
social factors (Carpenter 2000). The gendered landscape of
mental illnesses has not escaped such changes as diagnostic
categories and their knowledge base are often challenged
and disputed, and some tend to appear and disappear over
time (Manning 2001). As Busfield (2002) suggests that
such changes can be explained whereby when social expec-
tations (behaviours and emotions) for males and females
within a society change over a period of time, gender
differences for mental illnesses may change also. For
example, she cites how women’s greater participation in
the work place and greater public freedoms can impact on
them when they are confronted with psychological difficul-
ties, whereby they may resort to excessive alcohol and drug
use rather than becoming depressed.
Explaining gendered changes in mental
health-related behaviours
In trying to explain such gendered changes in mental
health-related behaviours, it is worth considering a realist
approach that view structure (e.g. work institutions,
gender) and agency (individuals, human behaviour,
gender) as separate strata whereby neither can be reduced,
explained or reconstructed from the other (Archer 1995,
Bhaskar 1998, Layder 2006). As Sayer (1992, p. 119)
notes, ‘even though social structures [gender] exist only
where people reproduce them, they have powers irreduc-
ible to those of individuals’. For that reason, understand-
ing individuals sometimes require a ‘macro regress’ to the
social institutions (e.g. psychiatry, the workplace) in which
they are situated, as well as a ‘micro regress’ (individuals).
Therefore, when we study changes in the gendered pat-
terns of various mental illnesses, for example, increases in
alcohol and drug use among women (Busfield 2002), we
need to explore structures (e.g. psychiatry, the workplace)
and agents (individuals, human behaviour) and how both
cannot merely be reduced to or explained by the other;
and at the same time, the relations between both is essen-
tial in understanding how that social world (changes in
the incidence of mental illness among men and women) is
transformed. In so doing, we acknowledge different levels
of social reality and avoid collapsing structure and agency.
The distinctive and emergent properties of the different
levels of that social world are recognized with the rela-
tions between them explained and understood more
clearly.
‘Social relations can have positive or negative
health effects’
The notion that social relations can have either a positive or
negative effect for health has origins from work relating to
the sociology of emotions and social network theory (Car-
penter 2000). The literature regularly suggests that married
people have better mental health than unmarried people
through greater social and emotional supports (Umberson
& Williams 1999, Simon 2002, Williams 2003a). While
men can be viewed as a source of social and emotional
support for women; a lack of such support and sometimes
living with men are well recognized as risk factors for
psychological ill health for both women and children
(Brown & Harris 1978, Oakley & Rigby 1998). Moreover,
while being married does make a difference, it is argued that
good mental health for both partners appears to be
M. Bergin et al.
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grounded within the quality of the relationship (Horwitz
et al. 1998, Simon 2002, Williams 2003a).
Additionally, both men and women appear socially dis-
advantaged in relation to their gender roles, a view that is
expressed by both professional and lay societies. Brover-
mann et al. (1970) suggested that mental health profes-
sionals viewed ideal healthy behaviour in terms of male
stereotypical characteristics, while, Goldberg & Huxley
(1980) suggested that general practitioners were more
likely to identify women as experiencing mental health
difficulties than men. This has left women in a less favour-
able or ‘no win’ situation (Fawcett & Karban 2005). Fur-
thermore, Tudor et al. (1977, 1979) suggested that society
appears more tolerant of women’s ‘out of the ordinary’
behaviours, and equally tends to react more promptly to
men who exhibit disturbed and psychotic behaviour. They
also found that males were hospitalized more readily, and
had longer admission stays than females who were equally
as unwell.
‘Women’s advantage in life expectancy is a
mixed blessing?’
Carpenter (2000) also presents this proposition as a ques-
tion. He suggests that although women’s life expectancy
is greater; however, this advantage may not be when
quality of life is considered. The relationship between age
and mental health is important as the numbers of elderly
people continue to grow worldwide (Cockerbam 2006).
However, there is a lack of empirical work about mental
health problems in older people, with much of the work
originating from clinical and social policy researchers and
their epidemiological surveys at the expense of sociologi-
cal theory (Rogers & Pilgrim 2005). Layder’s (1993,
1998, 2006) social domains (psychobiography, situated
activity, social settings and contextual resources) theory
and the methodology of adaptive theory provide a pos-
sible framework to address this lack in social theory. This
is a realist approach that attempts to ‘trace the reciprocal
influences and interconnections between people’s social
activities and the wider social (systemic) environment in
which they are played out’ (Layder 1998, p. 20). Thus, it
is an approach that concentrates on ‘interweaving’ the
macro and micro features of social life alongside a back-
drop of multiple social domains, and their relationships
to power that extends across time and space (Layder
1998, 2006).
Concluding comments
The central argument of this paper is to further advance the
debate that considers critical realism as an alternative
approach for conceptualizing gender, mental health, and its
relatedness to research and practice. In so doing, an under-
standing of gender that does not dismiss what is already
known (constructivist domain of knowledge), yet goes
beyond in the development of more comprehensive and
profound explanations is argued for. This allows the bio-
logical (sex) and social (gender) domains of knowledge for
mental health and illness to coexist, without either being
reduced to or defined by the other. This argument is pro-
gressed using Carpenter’s (2000) eight realist propositions
for research on gender, health and illness. These proposi-
tions and their relatedness to gender and mental health
research and practice are considered. Arguably, greater
depth and explanations for gender and mental health issues
are presented within a realist metatheory.
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